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Non-technical summary 
Knowledge produced in the public sector has been found to be an important ingredient of 
economic growth and technological progress. Close links to academic research have further 
been shown to be beneficial for innovation performance of the individual firm. As there are 
many different channels through which academic science reaches the private sector, most 
prominently licensing contracts, joint research and academic consulting, it is important for 
the decision making of policy makers and managers to assess their effectiveness. Most of the 
existing research has focused on formal university technology transfer mechanisms, i.e. those 
that embody or directly lead to a legal instrument like a patent, license or royalty agreement. 
Only a few authors have investigated informal university technology transfer mechanisms. 
Informal technology transfer focuses on non-contractual interactions of the agents involved, 
i.e. on university scientists and industry personnel. Research suggests that formal and 
informal technology transfer may go well together in that informal contacts improve the 
quality of a formal relationship or that formal contracts are accompanied by an informal 
relation of mutual exchange on technology-related aspects.  
In this paper, we analyze whether these activities are mutually reinforcing, i.e. 
complementary. Our analysis is based on a comprehensive dataset of more than 2,000 
German manufacturing firms. We perform direct and indirect tests for the complementarity of 
formal and informal technology transfer. Our results confirm a complementary relationship: 
using both transfer channels contributes to higher innovation performance. The management 
of the firm should therefore strive to maintain close informal relationships with universities to 
realize the full potential of formal technology transfer. 
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Universitäten und außeruniversitäre Forschungseinrichtungen besitzen eine zentrale 
Bedeutung für die Innovationsaktivitäten von Industrieunternehmen. Wissen, das unter 
Mitwirkung von öffentlichen Forschungseinrichtungen generiert wird, kann dabei durch 
grundsätzlich zwei Kanäle an Unternehmen übertragen werden. Dabei handelt es sich zum 
einen um formellen Technologietransfer, beispielsweise durch einen Vertrag über eine 
lizenzierte Technologie, gemeinsame Forschungsaktivitäten oder durch universitäre 
Beratungsdienstleistungen, zum anderen um informellen Technologietransfer. Dieser 
bezeichnet den Transfer technologischen Wissens durch nicht-vertragliche Interaktionen von 
Universitäts- und Industriepersonal. Nur wenige Autoren haben bislang die Determinanten 
und Effekte informeller Technologietransfers untersucht. Vieles spricht allerdings dafür, dass 
sich beide Formen des Technologietransfers wechselseitig beeinflussen, in anderen Worten 
komplementär zueinander sind. Beispielsweise können informelle Kontakte die Qualität eines 
formellen Technologietransfers unterstützen. 
Wir untersuchen in diesem Beitrag die Komplementarität beider Formen des 
Technologietransfers. Unsere Analyse basiert auf einem umfassenden Datensatz, der mehr als 
2.000 deutsche Unternehmen im verarbeitenden Gewerbes umfasst. Im Rahmen der Analyse  
verwenden wir direkte und indirekte Komplementaritätstests. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass 
beide Formen zueinander komplementär sind, d.h. die Nutzung beider Transferkanäle führt 
zu einem höheren Innovationserfolg. Für das Management von Unternehmen ist es daher 
bedeutsam, enge informelle Beziehungen zu öffentlichen Forschungseinrichtungen zu 
unterhalten, um das volle Potenzial eines formellen Technologietransfers zu realisieren. 
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Abstract 
Literature has identified formal and informal channels in university technology transfer. 
While formal technology transfer typically involves a legal contract on a patent or on 
collaborative research activities, informal transfer channels refer to personal contacts and 
hence to the tacit dimension of knowledge transfer. Research is, however, scarce regarding 
the interaction of formal and informal transfer mechanisms. In this paper, we analyze whether 
these activities are mutually reinforcing, i.e. complementary. Our analysis is based on a 
comprehensive dataset of more than 2,000 German manufacturing firms. We perform direct 
and indirect tests for the complementarity of formal and informal technology transfer. Our 
results confirm a complementary relationship: using both transfer channels contributes to 
higher innovation performance. The management of the firm should therefore strive to 
maintain close informal relationships with universities to realize the full potential of formal 
technology transfer.  
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1 Introduction 
Knowledge produced in the public sector has been found to be an important ingredient of 
economic growth and technological progress (Jaffe, 1989; Adams, 1990). Close links to 
academic research have further been shown to be beneficial for innovation performance of 
the individual firm (Cockburn and Henderson, 1998; Cassiman et al., 2007). As there are 
many different channels through which academic science reaches the private sector, most 
prominently licensing contracts (Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Thursby and Kemp, 2002), joint 
research (Cockburn and Henderson, 1998) and academic consulting (Thursby et al., 2007), it 
is important for the decision making of policy makers and managers to assess their 
effectiveness (D'Este and Patel, 2007).  
Recent patterns of evidence for university technology transfer focus on the institutions (e.g. 
technology transfer offices), the agents involved in technology commercialization, academic 
spin-offs, university-industry cooperative research centers or science parks and incubators 
(Bozeman, 2000; Rothaermel et al., 2007; Aerts et al., 2007). Most of the existing research 
has focused on formal university technology transfer mechanisms, i.e. those that embody or 
directly lead to a legal instrument like a patent, license or royalty agreement (Bozeman, 2000; 
Siegel and Phan, 2005; Feldman et al., 2002; Thursby and Thursby, 2002). Only a few 
authors have investigated informal university technology transfer mechanisms (e.g. Link et 
al., 2007). Informal technology transfer focuses on primarily non-contractual interactions of 
the agents involved, i.e. on university scientists and industry personnel.1  
The differences between formal and informal technology transfer have not always been 
defined in a mutually exclusive way. Link et al. (2007), for example, define informal 
technology transfer as a mechanism facilitating the flow of technology knowledge through 
informal communication processes which could comprise technical assistance, consulting or 
collaborative research. In contrast to formal technology transfer mechanisms which often aim 
at transferring a specified research outcome like a patent, informal mechanisms do not, and 
there is usually no expectation that they will. In this sense, formal technology transfer is 
conceived as a way to allocate property rights whereas those are of much less importance in 
informal technology transfer. This definition is however not always without problems. Siegel 
                                                 
1 In the following, we will use the term “university scientist” as shorthand for scientists employed at universities or other 
public research institutes. 
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et al. (2003) and Thursby et al. (2007) found that many university scientists in the US do not 
disclose their inventions to their university although prescribed by law. And even if 
university inventions are publicly disclosed some firms will try to contact scientists and 
arrange to work with them directly (Hall et al., 2003). While such a situation could be 
interpreted as an informal technology transfer, we can assume that in most cases there will at 
least be a contractual relationship between the scientist and the firm, governing the nature of 
the collaboration including duties and remuneration. The contract itself makes it hence a 
formal technology transfer. Consequently, in this paper we define informal technology 
transfer as a mechanism that does not involve any contractual relationship between the 
university scientist and the firm. Examples could be contacts between academics and industry 
personnel at conferences, or other informal contacts, talks and meetings. 
The relationship between formal and informal technology transfer is not yet clear-cut. 
Research suggests that formal and informal technology transfer may go well together (Siegel 
et al., 2003; Link et al., 2007) in that informal contacts improve the quality of a formal 
relationship or that formal contracts are accompanied by an informal relation of mutual 
exchange on technology-related aspects. Each type of transfer mechanism has its unique 
advantages and shortcomings. It is therefore not surprising that both types may occur 
simultaneously in order to transfer codified knowledge in the form of a patent or license as 
well as tacit knowledge through the interaction between the university scientist and industry 
personnel (Perkmann and Walsh, 2007). In other words, it seems reasonable to assume a 
complementary relationship between formal and informal technology transfer. 
Surprisingly, there has been little systematic research on the interaction between formal and 
informal technology transfer. The purpose of this paper is therefore to provide empirical 
evidence on the relationship between both transfer mechanisms. In contrast to other papers in 
the domain that focus on the individual scientist (e.g., Louis et al., 1989; Owen-Smith and 
Powell, 2001; 2003), we adopt the perspective of the firm engaging in university technology 
transfer. In fact, universities have frequently been regarded as a source of unique and 
valuable knowledge which has been characterized as the most important asset of a firm for 
achieving competitive advantage (Grant, 1996; Liebeskind, 1996). Using a comprehensive 
sample of more than 2,000 German firms, we conduct direct and indirect tests for 
complementarity and derive implications for managers and policy makers. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section contains a discussion of 
the two transfer mechanisms, their interaction and the trajectories through which they may 
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impact the innovation performance of firms. Section 3 describes our dataset and section 4 our 
empirical strategy. Section 5 presents our results and the final section outlines conclusions, 
implications of the empirical findings and limitations of our study. 
2 Literature Background 
Unique knowledge, be it internally or externally produced, has been characterized as the most 
valuable asset of a firm for achieving a competitive advantage (Liebeskind, 1996). This 
perspective is rooted in the resource and capability based view of the firm (Barney, 1991; 
Conner, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984) and has eventually culminated in a 
knowledge-based view of the firm (Grant, 1996). Knowledge is critical for a firm’s success as 
it provides the basis for decisions on which resources and capabilities to deploy, develop or 
discard when the environment changes (Ndofor and Levitas, 2004). However, using a 
competitive strategy that is built around knowledge is challenging. Knowledge is by its very 
nature a public good (Arrow, 1962; Jaffe, 1986) that could ‘spill over’ to competitors and 
allow them to free-ride on a firm’s investments in knowledge production. Relying on research 
generated in the public sector to achieve a knowledge-based competitive advantage might be 
even riskier as academic research results typically diffuse fast, e.g. through scientific 
publications and conferences. Dissemination of scientific findings is a central element of the 
reward system in public science as academic scientists strive for money, but also for appraisal 
from their scientific community (Merton, 1973).  
The strong incentives for firms to protect their unique knowledge against dissemination 
notwithstanding it has also been argued that opening up the innovation process and moving 
from ‘research and develop’ towards ‘connect and develop’ has its merits (Huston and 
Sakkab, 2006). It is particularly the ‘open innovation’ model by Chesbrough (2003) which 
develops this new perspective on how firms should innovate. Environmental changes which 
have become apparent in shorter product life cycles and the growing complexity of 
technologies and markets have forced firms to rely not exclusively on their own resources for 
the entire innovation process but on external sources of knowledge as well (Kogut and 
Zander, 1992). These developments motivate firms to reach out to actors beyond firm 
boundaries to maximize the benefits from inventions and ideas (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 
2001). Literature has provided evidence for positive innovation performance effects from 
incorporating external knowledge at various levels (e.g., Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; 
Cockburn and Henderson, 1998; Gambardella, 1995; Cassiman et al., 2007). Such effects 
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center on the innovation success (Gemünden et al., 1992; Love and Roper, 2004), an 
increased novelty of innovations (Landry and Amara, 2002), and higher returns on R&D 
investments (Nadiri, 1993).  
Against the background of increasing collaboration activities of the business sector 
(Hagedoorn, 2002), industry-science interactions play a particular role. Strongly supported by 
national policies, most prominently the US Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 and its European 
equivalents, industry-science collaborations have increased significantly over the recent past 
as becomes for instance visible in increased research joint ventures with university 
participation (Link, 1996; Link and Scott, 2005) and emerging joint industry-science R&D 
centres (Cohen et al., 2002). The nature of industry-science collaborations is presumably very 
different from intra-industry interactions. While within-industry R&D collaboration is mainly 
employed in order to internalize spillover effects (D'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; De 
Bondt, 1996) and to benefit from complementarities (Hagedoorn, 2002), industry-science 
collaborations are targeting different goals as the R&D process in the business sector and in 
universities is quite different (Dasgupta and David, 1994). While business sector R&D is 
directed at commercial success, knowledge produced at universities is rather basic in nature 
(Trajtenberg et al., 1997). Technological knowledge generated by universities can be seen as 
the result of a dynamic development that is hard for firms to develop internally, since this 
process relies on a vivid discussion of earlier research results including a careful 
documentation of trial and error. Nevertheless or just because of that, university science and 
inventions are considered to be among the most important knowledge sources for innovation 
activities for the US business sector (Cohen et al., 2002) and Europe’s largest firms (Arundel 
and Geuna, 2004). Due to its codification and careful documentation university research can 
further lead to efficiency enhancement in private research and to avoiding duplicated research 
(Dasgupta and David, 1994; Hall et al., 2003; Crespi et al., 2006). University involvement 
has been further found to be especially important in new technological areas, where business 
partners expect university scientists to translate and explain the nature of research being 
undertaken and to anticipate future research problems in those areas (Hall et al., 2003, for the 
US Advanced Technology Program).  
Overall, there is a significant body of literature documenting that such industry-science links 
are fruitful. For example, Mansfield (1991) substantiates a research input from scientific 
institutions to be important for developing new products and processes. More precisely, 
without academic research 11 percent of new product innovations and 9 percent of process 
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innovations would not have been developed, accounting for 3 percent and 1 percent of sales 
respectively. University collaborations are found to enhance the acquisition and assimilation 
of basic research in the firms and further lead to a sooner technology development and 
commercialization of the projects with university involvement (Hall et al., 2003). The 
benefits of university collaborations are not limited to co-invented technologies, but spill over 
to non-science related patented technologies of the firms as Cassiman et al. (2008) show 
based on an analysis of references to scientific literature in patents.  
Accessing knowledge from universities can go through a wide variety of interaction modes 
(Arundel and Geuna, 2004; D'Este and Patel, 2007) including formal transfer mechanisms 
like licensing and the acquisition of patents (Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Thursby and Kemp, 
2002), joint research (Cockburn and Henderson, 1998) or consulting (Thursby et al., 2007) – 
which involve a contract – as well as informal transfer mechanisms like informal contacts, 
meetings, conferences or citations in firm patents to scientific non-patent literature (Spence, 
2003; Cassiman et al., 2007; Link et al., 2007).  
Adopting the perspective of the firm, the choice of the technology transfer mode should 
primarily depend on the type of knowledge and its opportunities for exploitation. On the one 
hand, formal technology transfer provides the firm with a clearly-contoured research result or 
solution to a particular technological problem. Formal technology transfer through licensing 
for instance requires rather limited interaction. Similarly, other formal transfer modes like 
contract research or consulting allow firms to specify the desired research outcome which is 
subsequently transferred with all exploitation rights (Perkmann and Walsh, 2007). Through 
formal technology transfer firms gain access to complementary codified scientific 
knowledge, which they can exploit to create a unique combination of knowledge in order to 
enhance the quality of their inventions (Cassiman et al., 2008) or to realize efficiency gains 
for business R&D (Dasgupta and David, 1994; Crespi et al., 2006). The flipside of the coin is 
that university licenses and other types of contracts may be sold to competitors as well, which 
limits the potential for creating unique and valuable combinations of firm resources (Saviotti, 
1998). Further, knowledge exchange might be limited to the stipulated amount.  
On the other hand, informal technology transfer through contacts, meetings or conferences 
gives a firm the opportunity to browse for relevant technological knowledge without 
mobilizing substantial human or financial resources. Moreover, informal technology transfer 
enables firms to access tacit knowledge surrounding formalized technological knowledge that 
may actually be needed in order to integrate scientific knowledge into the firm’s R&D 
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process. To achieve this, close interaction of personnel from the university and the firm is 
required. Moreover, informal technology transfer may facilitate the attraction of talented 
researchers from academia who may contribute both to the quality of internal research efforts 
and act as ‘gatekeepers’ to bridge the firm’s research activities with academic science 
(Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001). In this respect, Fabrizio (2006) illustrates the importance of 
absorptive capacity of the firm through an acquisition of scientific personnel, which leads to a 
better exploitation of scientific research and shorter time lags between knowledge acquisition 
and inventions. Although a lack of a formal collaboration framework might be considered a 
shortcoming of informal transfer in isolation, the knowledge gained from informal transfer 
limits competitor’s opportunities for imitation (Aschhoff and Sofka, 2008). 
As suggested by the discussion of informal technology transfer above both modes of 
technology transfer may go well together (Siegel et al., 2003; Link et al., 2007). Informal 
contacts presumably improve the quality of a formal relationship or formal contracts may be 
accompanied by an informal relation of mutual exchange on technology-related aspects. It is 
therefore sensible to assume that both types occur simultaneously in order to transfer codified 
knowledge as well as tacit knowledge through the interaction between the university scientist 
and industry personnel (Perkmann and Walsh, 2007). Put differently, we hypothesize a 
complementary relationship between formal and informal technology transfer, i.e. that it is 
not an isolated transfer mode that provides firms with superior innovation performance but 
instead a combination of both transfer modes. The following section introduces the empirical 
part of our paper. 
3 Data 
The underlying database is the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP), a survey which has been 
conducted annually by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) on behalf of the 
German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) since 1992. The MIP is the 
German part of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) of the European Commission. We 
restrict the sample to German manufacturing firms as technology transfer presumably has a 
different nature for services. This paper is based on the 2003 wave that asks firms whether 
they have collaborated with universities or public research institutes in the period from 2000-
2002. Firms were asked to rate the importance of several technology transfer channels. In line 
with our definition of formal and informal technology transfer, we defined the following 
collaboration modes as being formal: 
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- collaborative research 
- contract research 
- technology consulting  
- licensing and acquisition of technologies developed at universities 
All four measures are based upon a contractual relationship. Moreover, they focus on a 
transfer of disembodied technology knowledge as they do not involve a transfer of personnel. 
These four measures exhibit common characteristics in that they involve a legal contract. 
Hence, we summarize them under one variable for formal technology transfer. Informal 
technology transfer is defined by the survey item ‘informal contacts to universities and public 
research institutes’. Out of the 2,092 firms in our sample 691 collaborated with the scientific 
sector in a formal and 786 in an informal way. Of those, 614 firms used both forms of 
collaboration while 1,229 firms did not engage in any university technology transfer 
relationship. 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of firms across the different formal university collaboration 
modes. The light grey area indicates the number of firms that also have informal links to the 
university. The dark grey area shows firms that rely on formal links only. It becomes 
apparent that all types of formal collaboration modes mostly coincide with informal links to 
the university. Focusing on the distribution of formal collaboration modes, it seems surprising 
that university licensing which is receiving much attention in the literature on industry-
science links is used by relatively few German firms. A likely explanation for the relatively 
low rate of licensing agreements between firms and universities and the high frequency of 
informal links in Germany is that until 2002 the ‘professor’s privilege’ (‘Hochschullehrer-
privileg’) was in place. Once derived from Article 5 of the German constitution, which 
pertains to the freedom of science and research, the professor’s privilege constituted that 
professors were the only occupational group in Germany that had the right to use their 
scientific results for private commercialization even if the underlying research was financed 
by the university (Kilger and Bartenbach, 2002). The professors’ right to commercialize 
inventions privately before 2002 is reflected by a low number of German university patents 
(Czarnitzki et al., 2007; Czarnitzki et al., 2008), which translates into low university licensing 
activities in Germany as compared to the US, where the Bayh-Dole Act, which can be seen as 
the US counterpart of the German abolishment of the professors’ privilege, took place already 
more than twenty years ago.  
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Figure 1 further shows that academic consulting is the most commonly used collaboration 
mode. Consulting to the business sector is an important way for scientists to increase their 
research budgets as has been found to be an important industry-science link for US 
universities as well (Link et al., 2007; Thursby et al., 2007).  
Figure 1: Frequency of different formal and informal links to the university 
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We add ‘supply-side factors’ in university technology transfer by matching our firm-level 
dataset with regional data from the year 2000 on the number of university scientists in the 
NUTS-3 region where the firm is located. We did not restrict this number to any particular 
scientific discipline but normalized it by dividing it by the population of the region. 
Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics distinguishing between the four groups of firms 
according to their involvement in collaboration with scientific institutions.2 It becomes 
apparent that firms engaged in formal and informal technology transfer are the largest in 
terms of employment, R&D intensity, innovation sales over total sales3, share of skilled 
workers, as defined by labor force with a university degree, and export sales. The high R&D 
intensity of firms using both modes of technology transfer suggests that firms require 
substantial absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; 1990) in order to reap the fruits 
                                                 
2 The definition of the industry classification can be found in Table 5 Table 1in the Appendix. 
3 Note that the percentage of innovation sales is derived from the last three years. 
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from formal and informal university collaboration. Skilled labor as defined by employees 
with a university degree might be essential not only for the exploitation of formal 
relationships but much more for the establishment of informal contacts to the university. The 
higher innovation sales of firms using both technology transfer modes are a first indication 
for the complementarity of formal and informal university links. 
Note that for the continuous variables Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations for 
two different years. We use the continuous variables as firm size and R&D intensity with a 
one year lag in our later regression for the choice of the collaboration modes in order to limit 
endogeneity problems with respect to the regressors. For the same reason we linked the cross-
section 2003 to the cross-section 2004. In the last part of the analysis we estimate the effect 
of the different transfer mechanisms on innovation sales. Using a lead of the dependent 
variable is again an attempt to limit endogeneity problems. Unfortunately, only a subsample 
of 884 firms responded to the sample in both years, which reduces the number of observation 
in the last part of the analysis.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 Formal collaboration only Informal collaboration only 
Formal and informal 
collaboration No collaboration 
 # obs. mean std. dev. # obs. mean std. dev. # obs. mean std. dev. # obs. mean std. dev. 
R&D/employment2002 77 0.01 0.03 172 0.01 0.01 613 0.02 0.03 1230 0.00 0.01 
R&D/employment2001 77 0.01 0.02 172 0.01 0.01 613 0.02 0.03 1230 0.00 0.01 
Innovation sales/total sales2003 40 18.45 29.14 84 16.12 22.62 297 25.29 27.18 568 9.44 18.67 
Innovation sales/total sales2002 77 16.77 25.61 172 17.81 23.70 613 23.10 26.53 1230 10.66 20.33 
I(Innovation sales/employment2003>0)  40 0.50 0.51 84 0.55 0.50 297 0.75 0.43 568 0.38 0.49 
I(Innovation sales/employment2002>0) 77 0.38 0.49 172 0.33 0.47 613 0.52 0.50 1230 0.20 0.40 
Share of skilled labor force2002 77 19.10 22.21 172 16.36 16.33 613 23.18 21.85 1230 12.55 12.24 
No. of skilled workers2002 77 0.04 0.19 172 0.05 0.21 613 0.02 0.15 1230 0.16 0.37 
Skilled labor force/R&D2002 77 28.60 43.53 172 24.04 34.64 613 33.93 230.13 1230 77.02 666.52 
Share of skilled labor force2001 77 17.58 22.05 172 16.28 16.47 613 22.45 21.85 1230 12.19 12.20 
No. of skilled workers2001 77 0.06 0.25 172 0.05 0.20 613 0.02 0.15 1230 0.17 0.37 
Employment2002 77 270.23 681.92 172 298.98 689.48 613 2941.44 21127.83 1230 250.66 1126.84 
Employment2001 77 293.59 715.46 172 334.88 695.37 613 3069.75 23108.83 1230 252.68 1011.77 
Product innovator 77 0.62 0.49 172 0.65 0.48 613 0.85 0.36 1230 0.44 0.50 
Process innovator 77 0.40 0.49 172 0.41 0.49 613 0.57 0.50 1230 0.30 0.46 
Scientists per 1000 inhabitants in region2000 77 2.29 5.15 172 2.58 5.16 613 3.55 5.65 1230 2.20 4.78 
Export sales2002 77 62.15 187.56 172 50.33 90.01 613 746.87 6946.96 1230 54.22 200.10 
Export sales2001 77 72.80 189.34 172 71.67 116.67 613 762.53 6937.55 1230 65.47 215.41 
East Germany 77 0.31 0.47 172 0.32 0.47 613 0.31 0.46 1230 0.30 0.46 
Firm age 77 14.57 13.28 172 18.48 15.34 613 25.35 83.76 1230 19.23 17.22 
Part of a firm group 77 0.43 0.50 172 0.46 0.50 613 0.53 0.50 1230 0.51 0.50 
… with a headquarter outside of Germany 77 0.16 0.37 172 0.13 0.34 613 0.15 0.36 1230 0.06 0.23 
Industry 1 77 0.16 0.37 172 0.12 0.32 613 0.06 0.24 1230 0.16 0.36 
Industry 2 77 0.04 0.19 172 0.03 0.17 613 0.01 0.11 1230 0.05 0.21 
Industry 3 77 0.12 0.32 172 0.15 0.35 613 0.17 0.38 1230 0.13 0.34 
Industry 4 77 0.08 0.27 172 0.03 0.18 613 0.06 0.24 1230 0.05 0.21 
Industry 5 77 0.16 0.37 172 0.15 0.36 613 0.12 0.33 1230 0.17 0.38 
Industry 6 77 0.16 0.37 172 0.16 0.36 613 0.18 0.38 1230 0.13 0.34 
Industry 7 77 0.22 0.42 172 0.23 0.42 613 0.27 0.44 1230 0.14 0.34 
Industry 8 77 0.05 0.22 172 0.09 0.29 613 0.11 0.31 1230 0.12 0.32 
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4 Empirical Strategy: Testing for Complementarity 
In order to test for complementarity of formal and informal links to the university we apply 
an empirical strategy that is based on the theory of supermodularity (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1995; Arora, 1996; Athey and Stern, 1998; Lokshin et al., 2004) which has been used in the 
field of industrial organization and management in recent years (e.g., Mohnen and Röller, 
2005; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Kaiser, 2003; Lokshin et al., 2004; Catozzella and 
Vivarelli, 2007). In these contexts, complementarity is defined as the increase in marginal or 
incremental return to one practice if other practices are in use as well. In our application we 
are interested in testing whether the use of informal university technology transfer increases 
the returns of formal technology transfer or vice-versa. Intuitively, this means that using the 
second channel of collaboration if the other one is in place has a higher incremental impact 
on innovation performance than using one of the modes more intense in isolation. 
Analogously, we would find that informal and formal technology transfer are substitutes if 
one of the links would decrease the marginal or incremental returns from one to the other 
collaboration mode. Two tests have been derived from the concept of supermodularity 
(Arora, 1996; Athey and Stern, 1998): an indirect test and a direct test on complementarity. 
Both will be applied in the empirical section. 
4.1 The Indirect Approach 
The indirect approach tests for a positive correlation between different practices conditional 
on a vector of covariates X (Arora, 1996; Athey and Stern, 1998). The indirect approach gives 
an indication of complementarity based on the assumption that the actual choice of the 
chosen practice(s) maps the firm’s optimal decision. It has the advantage that it can be used if 
performance effects of the chosen practices cannot be observed.  
In order to account for unobserved firm heterogeneity that can bias the test results (i.e. if 
unobserved factors drive the benefits from the application of the single or combined practices 
so that complementarity would be falsely rejected or falsely not rejected (Athey and Stern, 
1998), it is recommended to use an exclusion restriction that directly impacts one of the 
practices, but not the other. If there is complementarity between two different practices there 
will be a positive effect on the combined use of the those (Arora, 1996; Athey and Stern, 
1998; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Catozzella and Vivarelli, 2007). Athey and Stern 
(1998) label this procedure the ‘reduced-form test’ for complementarity. Note that this test is 
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only useful if there are not more than two practices to be tested as for more options a strong 
indirect effect might outweigh a substitution effect of the pair of practices. We implement 
this test as a multinomial logit model for the mutually exclusive collaboration modes: formal, 
informal technology transfer, both, and none.  
4.2 The Direct Approach 
The direct approach tests whether the simultaneous adoption of different practices, formal 
and informal technology transfer, has a positive impact on innovation performance. If the 
joint use of both collaboration modes has the highest impact as compared to using one of the 
channels in isolation they are complements (Arora, 1996; Athey and Stern, 1998; Mohnen 
and Röller, 2005; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Catozzella and Vivarelli, 2007; Lokshin et 
al., 2004).  
In our empirical application we have hence three different possible collaboration patterns for 
each firm i, formal collaboration (A1), informal collaboration (A2), and both informal and 
formal collaboration (A1*A2), entering our empirical model for the innovation performance 
at the firm level: 
I(A1 i,A2 i,X i) = A1i*b10 + A2 i*b01 + A1 i*A2 i * b11 + X i  + u i    (1) 
The direct test derives directly from the inequality defined by the theory on supermodularity 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1995). In case of complementarity we should find:  
b11 ≥ b10 + b01.           (2) 
5 Empirical Results 
As outlined above, we apply the indirect and direct test in order to investigate whether there 
is complementarity between formal and informal technology transfer. We start with an 
investigation of the correlation between both collaboration modes conditional on absorptive 
capacity and other characteristics of the firm. Formal and informal technology transfer are 
defined as non-exclusive activities of the firms, i.e. it is possible that the firms have used 
both. We estimate the following bivariate probit model: 
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where Zi is a vector of firm characteristics.  
The results are presented in Table 2. The most important finding is that there is a significant 
positive relationship between formal and informal technology transfer as indicated by the 
positive and significant correlation coefficient . This finding suggests that formal and 
informal links are likely to occur in combination and is hence a first indication of 
complementarity. The estimation results further show that there is no substantial 
heterogeneity in firm characteristics predicting formal and informal technology transfer. In 
line with our expectations, firm size and absorptive capacity as is reflected by R&D intensity 
are important to engage in any technology transfer from the university. Moreover, skilled 
workers (normalized by R&D) matter significantly and having no employees with a 
university degree significantly lowers the probability of using either one technology transfer 
mode from the university. Employees with a university degree are supposed to be essential 
for establishing and maintaining contacts to the university. Further, the density of scientists in 
the region is an important determinant for technology transfer from the university. This 
variable is supposed to be especially important for informal technology transfer independent 
on whether formal transfer is in place or not because the chance of informal knowledge 
transfer is supposed to increase by the likelihood to meet scientists in daily life. Moreover, 
firms being part of a firm group are less engaged in university collaboration be it formal or 
informal. This effect is less strong for firm groups with a foreign headquarter. A likely 
explanation is that firm groups give priority to collaboration within the group and that firm 
groups with a foreign headquarter might be more interested in learning about local 
technologies than domestically led firm groups. Lastly, Eastern German firms turn out to be 
more likely to collaborate with universities. 
The only difference for the predictors of using formal versus informal links to the university 
is found in the age of firms. While the likelihood of formal technology transfer decreases in 
firm age there is no significant effect for the use of informal technology transfer. 
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Table 2:  Bivariate probit estimation for the choice of formal and informal technology 
transfer 
 Formal technology transfer Informal technology transfer 
 coefficient std. err. coefficient std. err. 
Log(employment2001) 0.15 *** 0.03 0.13 *** 0.03 
East Germany2002 0.14 ** 0.07 0.15 ** 0.07 
Log(firm age2002) -0.08 ** 0.04 -0.03  0.04 
Log(export2001) 0.04 ** 0.02 0.05 *** 0.02 
R&D/employment2001 10.46 *** 2.07 9.08 *** 2.08 
No skilled workers -0.38 *** 0.14 -0.52 *** 0.14 
Log(Skilled workers/R&D2001) 0.03 *** 0.00 0.03 *** 0.00 
Product innovator2002 0.40 *** 0.08 0.38 *** 0.08 
Process innovator2002 0.16 ** 0.07 0.15 ** 0.07 
Log(scientists per capita2000) 0.01 *** 0.01 0.01 *** 0.01 
Part of a firm group2002 -0.64 *** 0.08 -0.64 * 0.08 
… with a headquarter outside of Germany2002 0.58 *** 0.11 0.59 *** 0.11 
Industry 1 -0.01  0.13 -0.13  0.12 
Industry 2 -0.08  0.21 -0.18  0.20 
Industry 3 0.23 * 0.12 0.18  0.12 
Industry 4 0.66 *** 0.16 0.42 *** 0.16 
Industry 5 0.18  0.12 0.09  0.11 
Industry 6 0.23 * 0.12 0.14  0.11 
Industry 7 0.31 *** 0.11 0.25 ** 0.11 
constant -1.09 *** 0.19 -0.85 *** 0.19 
ρ 0.88 *** 0.14    
Number of observations 2092      
Wald-2 609.27 ***     
 
In the next step, we dig deeper into the firms’ choice for a particular collaboration mode. In 
order to do so we apply the indirect structural test for complementarity that was described in 
the previous section. Under the assumption that firms make the best choice in terms of 
collaboration modes we estimate a multinomial logit model for their actual choices: formal, 
informal technology transfer, both and none: 
},&,,{;)(Prob 4
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noneinformalformalinformalformalj
e
ejY
k
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
,   (4) 
where Zi is a vector of firm characteristics. Firms without university collaboration serve as 
the reference case. Notice that in contrast to model (3) the alternatives are exclusive now, i.e. 
each firm can only belong to one of the four groups.  
As outlined in the previous section the indirect test relies on an exclusion restriction that 
affects the use of one of the transfer modes in isolation as well as the combined use of both 
practices while not the use of the other transfer mode in isolation, i.e. a variable that shows 
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that the marginal return from one technology transfer type is increased by the other. The 
literature on absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; 1990) provides us with a 
theoretical argument for an instrumental variable with a focus on formal technology transfer 
modes. Absorptive capacity encompasses three major components: the identification of 
valuable external knowledge, its assimilation with existing knowledge resources and finally 
its exploitation in the innovation process. Hence, it provides a firm with more options 
reacting to opportunities that arise in the environment (Bowman and Hurry, 1993; March, 
1991). Accordingly, firms with a higher absorptive capacity are likely to better exploit 
incoming technology transfers (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006). In line with these arguments, 
we suggest that a high absorptive capacity should increase the expected marginal returns 
from formal links in isolation as it reflects superior exploitation capabilities. Further, 
absorptive capacity should increase the marginal returns from informal links in the presence 
of formal links making the collaboration more effective. We do not expect an effect of 
absorptive capacity on the expected returns from informal technology transfer in isolation 
because informal university links are supposed to rather depend on the research personnel in 
the firm and the university in the local area. In order to measure absorptive capacity we use 
the firms’ past R&D intensity as a proxy because absorptive capacity is typically developed 
as a by-product of internal R&D activities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). Past R&D should 
increase the awareness of what is needed to optimally exploit collaboration opportunities with 
the university (Fabrizio, 2006).  
Two further exclusion restrictions are used that center around informal links. As stated above 
we expect that informal links mainly depend on the education of the R&D personnel involved 
in the firm. While the R&D intensity is considered as a measure of the firm’s R&D capacity 
skilled R&D workers and the number of scientists in the same region are expected to be the 
main predictors of the establishment of informal links. We do not expect an effect of those 
variables on formal links as such links are more likely to be established by the head of the 
R&D department or the R&D manager, but we expect that informal links to enhance the 
effectiveness of such formal links. 
Table 3 presents the estimation results for model (4). Most important, our exclusion 
restrictions for the indirect test work: R&D intensity as a proxy for absorptive capacity 
impacts the choice of formal links in isolation as well as the joint use of formal and informal 
technology transfer, while there is no impact on the choice of informal technology transfer. 
Hence, we can conclude that absorptive capacity increases the expected marginal returns 
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from informal links in the presence of formal links. The second set of exclusion restrictions 
that builds on the importance of the education of the firm’s R&D personnel and the 
availability of scientists in the geographical region shows that the abilities of firm personnel 
are indeed very important for informal technology transfers and that the marginal gains from 
those informal links are higher if formal links are in place. Having no employee with a 
university degree turns out to hinder informal transfers and also the expected outcome of the 
joint use of formal and informal technology transfer is lower for such firms. Having 
employees with a university education does not matter for formal transfers as was 
hypothesized. The concentration of scientists in the region has no significant impact on the 
establishment of formal or informal links to the university in isolation. Hence, this exclusion 
restriction does not turn out to be valid for our data. A likely explanation is that technology 
markets are by no means regional and that firms are carefully screening global markets for 
technologies and collaborators that fit best to their innovation activities. A high concentration 
of scientists increases however the expected gains from using informal and formal technology 
transfer in combination as the last column of Table 3 shows. 
The results further show that the opportunities of firms for any kind of university 
collaboration increase with firm size. Moreover, firms that are part of a group of firms are 
less likely to engage with the university in a formal or informal way. They might exploit 
opportunities for collaboration within the firm group first. In line with the estimation results 
for model (3), Table 3 shows that firms which are a member of a firm group with a foreign 
headquarter are more involved in university collaboration than other firms that are part of a 
firm group. International firm groups might be more interested in absorbing academic 
knowledge in a foreign country (Sofka and Teichert, 2006) to exploit a variety of different 
innovation sources providing stimuli for innovation activities in the home country 
(Kuemmerle, 1998). A significant difference for the choice of technology transfer modes lies 
in the age of the firm as was already suggested by model (3). While the use of informal 
technology transfer and the use of both transfer modes are independent of firm age, the use of 
formal technology transfer decreases as firms get older. A likely explanation is that younger 
firms might have more formal ties with a university, particularly as they could be the result of 
a university spin-off which is based on a research result subsequently exploited for example 
by means of a licensing agreement.  
Table 3 further shows that there are many variables predicting the combined use of both 
technology transfer mechanisms but not the use of either one in isolation. Firms located in 
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Eastern Germany are for instance more likely to rely on both collaboration channels. A 
reason for this might be the structure of the economy in Eastern Germany where the former 
state combines were split up and many people employed in the R&D unit of the state 
combine became part of the public research sector. As a consequence, a lot of informal 
contacts between former colleagues were still in place and were accompanying a formal 
technology transfer. Also exporting firms are more likely to rely on formal and informal links 
to the university than on a single technology transfer mode. Lastly, product and process 
innovators are more in favour of the combined use of formal and informal technology 
transfers from the university. 
Table 3: Multinomial logit estimation for the choice of collaboration modes 
 
Formal technology 
transfer 
Informal technology 
transfer 
Formal and informal 
technology transfer 
 coefficient std. err. coefficient std. err. coefficient std. err 
Log(employment2001) 0.22 ** 0.10 0.12 * 0.07 0.26 *** 0.05 
East Germany2002 0.01  0.27 0.09  0.19 0.35 *** 0.14 
Log(age2002) -0.42 *** 0.13 -0.12  0.10 -0.10  0.07 
Log(export2001) -0.01  0.07 0.06  0.05 0.11 *** 0.03 
R&D/employment2001 13.87 * 8.36 6.52  7.13 19.77 *** 4.61 
No skilled workers -0.79  0.51 -1.24 *** 0.42 -0.84 *** 0.31 
Log(Skilled workers/ 
R&D2001) 0.02  0.02 0.04 *** 0.01 0.06 *** 0.01 
Product innovator2002 0.32  0.31 0.31  0.22 0.88 *** 0.16 
Process innovator2002 0.13  0.27 0.08  0.19 0.31 ** 0.13 
Log(scientists per capita2002) 0.02  0.02 0.00  0.01 0.03 *** 0.01 
Part of a firm group2002 -1.26 *** 0.31 -1.01 *** 0.20 -1.12 *** 0.15 
… with a headquarter outside 
of Germany2002 1.57 *** 0.40 1.19 *** 0.29 1.12 *** 0.21 
Industry 1 0.96 * 0.52 0.02  0.33 -0.25  0.25 
Industry 2 0.96  0.74 0.05  0.53 -0.52 * 0.47 
Industry 3 0.57  0.55 0.19  0.31 0.41 * 0.22 
Industry 4 1.59 *** 0.61 0.15  0.49 1.03 *** 0.30 
Industry 5 0.82  0.52 0.15  0.31 0.28  0.22 
Industry 6 0.83  0.52 0.17  0.31 0.32  0.22 
Industry 7 1.07 ** 0.51 0.47  0.30 0.58 *** 0.21 
Constant -3.07 *** 0.76 -1.87 *** 0.51 -2.01 *** 0.36 
Number of observations 2092         
LR 2 751.65 ***        
Pseudo R2 0.18         
 
We have seen that the correlation test as well as the indirect test provide evidence for 
complementarity with respect to the expected returns from informal and formal university 
collaboration. In the next step we conduct the direct test for complementarity of both 
technology transfer modes. We test whether the combined use of both translates into superior 
innovation performance. Our R&D performance measure is sales with innovative products, 
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defined as market novelties over total sales. We use the dependent variable with a one-year 
lead to limit endogeneity problems. As not all firms responded to the survey in the following 
year we have to conduct the test based on a reduced number of observations. The test is 
implemented using a tobit model to account for the fact that many firms have no sales with 
innovative products at all and others that have all their sales with innovative products. The 
estimated model can be written as: 
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Most important the coefficients for the informal and formal variable and the interaction term 
of those variables as they allow to directly test equation (2). Xi is a vector of covariates and ui 
the error term of the model. 
In addition, we estimate a probit model in search of complementarity of both technology 
transfer modes for the likelihood of having any innovation sales as a robustness check. The 
dependent variable is now a binary variable that equals one if innovation sales are larger than 
zero and zero otherwise. The model can be written as: 
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
 
otherwise                   0           
 0]0 I[ if                   1           ]0 [
*
i
i
salesinnovationsalesinnovationI   (7) 
Table 4 shows the estimation results. The results of both models show that using formal and 
informal technology transfer in combination contributes to firms’ innovation performance, 
while there is no performance effect of using one technology transfer mode in isolation. This 
is a strong indication for complementarity of formal and informal technology transfer. We 
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can further confirm this result based on one-sided tests on the null hypothesis of no 
complementarity (derived from equation (2)) at the 10% level of statistical significance (see 
bottom of Table 4). This confirms our findings from the previous sections.  
With respect to the control variables, it turns out that the major part of innovation sales over 
total sales is explained by innovation sales over total sales in the previous period. This is not 
surprising as the lagged dependent variable can be seen as an attempt to control for fixed 
effects in innovation performance. A few other variables have an effect on innovation sales. 
One is the indicator for R&D collaborations with firms. Like industry-science linkages, inter-
firm collaborations have a positive effect on innovation sales confirming prior findings (see 
Hagedoorn, 2002, for an overview). Further, the share of workers with a university degree 
and being a process innovator are predictors of innovation sales. SMEs and firms in firm 
groups with a foreign headquarter are less successful in terms of innovation output than 
others. 
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Table 4: Tobit and probit models for the effects of different university collaboration 
modes on innovation sales  
 % of Innovation sales2003 Innovation sales > 0 
 Tobit model Probit model 
 coefficient std. err. coefficient std. err. 
Formal collaboration2002 4.39  6.06 0.12  0.27 
Informal collaboration2002 1.60  3.95 0.10  0.18 
Formal and informal collaboration2002 16.02 *** 2.090 0.58 *** 0.13 
Collaboration with firms2002 13.95 *** 3.86 0.78 *** 0.20 
% Innovation sales/Employment2002 0.79 *** 0.05 1.01 *** 0.12 
Log(R&D2002) 0.40  1.31 -0.01  0.06 
Share of high skilled workers2002 12.30 * 7.14 0.94 *** 0.36 
Log(employment2002) -1.00  1.12 0.04  0.05 
SME2002 -6.33 * 3.59 -0.30 * 0.16 
Log(export2002) -0.37  0.54 -0.02  0.02 
East Germany2002 0.05  5.50 -0.00  0.11 
Log(age2002) -0.51  1.29 -0.04  0.06 
Process innovator2002 6.07 *** 2.42 0.42 *** 0.11 
Part of a firm group2002 6.55 *** 2.59 0.16  0.12 
… with a headquarter outside of Germany2002 -7.05 * 3.85 -0.32 * 0.18 
Industry 1 4.99  4.44 0.11  0.19 
Industry 2 -2.49  6.74 0.17  0.28 
Industry 3 5.79  4.18 0.22  0.18 
Industry 4 -1.00  5.90 -0.11  0.26 
Industry 5 1.07  4.14 0.07  0.18 
Industry 6 3.82  4.26 0.14  0.19 
Industry 7 8.31 ** 4.02 0.50 *** 0.18 
constant -17.09 ** 7.90 -0.83 ** 0.35 
Complementarity test: 
Formal & informal > formal + informal 
F-statistic: 
1.97 *  
2-statistic:  
2.04 *  
Number of observations 884   884   
Number of left-censored observations 441      
Number of right-censored observations 10      
LR-2 483.54 ***  348.41 ***  
Pseudo R2 0.10   0.28   
 
6 Conclusion and future research 
In this paper, we have analyzed the interplay of formal and informal university technology 
transfer modes and their importance for innovation performance of the firm. We defined 
informal technology transfer as a mechanism that does not involve any contractual 
relationship between the university scientist and the firm while formal technology transfer 
should be based on such a contract. Our analysis reveals that the use of formal and informal 
technology transfer with the university mostly coincide. Based on different types of 
complementarity tests, our empirical results have shown that formal and informal technology 
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transfer are complements, i.e. the use of informal technology transfer increases the marginal 
return of formal technology transfer.  
For an appropriate interpretation of the empirical findings it is important to pay attention to 
the environment the industry-science links take place in. Our analysis reveals, for instance, 
that university licensing is not as prominent in Germany as previous literature suggests for 
the US. The reason is that until 2002 professors owned the inventions they produced at 
German universities (‘professor’s privilege’). Hence, we observe only a few technologies that 
are patented through German universities, which leads to little opportunities for university 
licensing. In 2003, the professor’s privilege was abolished and since then universities own the 
inventions made in-house and have, hence, only since then been in charge of technology 
transfer. For the German university system, this means a significant change as universities 
mostly did not maintain professional technology transfer offices like US universities 
(Debackere and Veugelers, 2005). As a consequence, technology transfer offices just 
emerged in Germany in recent years. Against this background our empirical analysis suggests 
that universities should keep in mind the significant informal transfer which is already in 
place when designing technology transfer policies and commercialization incentive schemes 
for scientists. It can be a challenge to establish efficient centralized technology transfer 
offices at universities in the presence of existing technology transfer routines from science 
and industry although this change promises a significant reduction in transaction costs in the 
long run.  
Our results also have important management implications. First, firms interested in setting up 
a relationship with a university to transfer technology should be aware that the full potential 
of such a transfer can only be realized if both transfer channels are used. The reasons for this 
are twofold: Firms do not only require the codified knowledge, e.g. in a licensed patent, but 
also the tacit knowledge surrounding a particular technology. In this sense, establishing a 
permanent relationship with a university with varying degrees of formality or informality 
seems to be key in benefiting from knowledge developed externally at universities. 
Moreover, our empirical analysis highlights the importance of absorptive capacity for 
technology transfer and its exploitation within the firm.  
Further research should try to generate more insights on how formal and informal technology 
transfer mechanisms can be combined such that both sides benefit most. In this respect, it 
would particularly be interesting, on the one hand, to get insights on the evolution of 
technology transfer relationships, whether both channels can be observed at the same time or 
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whether one channel stimulates the other. On the other hand, it would be interesting for the 
case of Germany to conduct a similar analysis in a couple of years in order to evaluate the 
effect of the abolishment of the professor’s privilege on formal and informal technology 
transfer.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 5: Industry classification 
 
Abbreviation Industry NACE2 code 
Industry 1 Manufacture of food, tobacco and textiles, clothing 15, 16, 17,  18, 19 
Industry 2 Manufacture wood, cork, straw and plaiting materials, publishing, 
printing and reproduction of recorded media 
20, 21, 22 
Industry 3 Manufacture chemicals and plastics 23, 24, 25 
Industry 4 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 26 
Industry 5 Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products 27, 28 
Industry 6 Manufacture of machinery and equipment 29 
Industry 7 Manufacture of office machinery, electrical machinery, communication 
equipment and instruments 
30, 31, 32, 33 
Industry 8 Manufacture of transport equipment and manufacture n.e.c. 34, 35, 36, 37 
 
